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Noncooperative Games for Autonomous Consumer
Load Balancing over Smart Grid
Tarun Agarwal and Shuguang Cui
Abstract
Traditionally, most consumers of electricity pay for their consumptions according to a fixed rate. With the
advancement of Smart Grid technologies, large-scale implementation of variable-rate metering becomes more prac-
tical. As a result, consumers will be able to control their electricity consumption in an automated fashion, where
one possible scheme is to have each individual maximize its own utility as a noncooperative game. In this paper,
noncooperative games are formulated among the electricity consumers in Smart Grid with two real-time pricing
schemes, where the Nash equilibrium operation points are investigated for their uniqueness and load balancing
properties. The first pricing scheme charges a price according to the average cost of electricity borne by the retailer
and the second one charges according to a time-variant increasing-block price, where for each scheme, a zero-revenue
model and a constant-rate revenue model are considered. In addition, the relationship between the studied games
and certain competitive routing games from the computer networking community, known as atomic flow games, is
established, for which it is shown that the proposed noncooperative game formulation falls under the class of atomic
splittable flow games. The Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for four different combined cases corresponding to
the two pricing schemes and the two revenue models, and is unique for three of the cases under certain conditions.
It is further shown that both pricing schemes lead to similar electricity loading patterns when consumers are only
interested in minimizing the electricity costs without any other profit considerations. Finally, the conditions under
which the increasing-block pricing scheme is preferred over the average-cost based pricing scheme are discussed.
Index Terms
Game Theory, Noncooperative Game, Atomic Splittable Flow Game, Nash Equilibrium, Smart Grid, Real Time
Pricing, Increasing-Block Pricing.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the traditional power market, electricity consumers usually pay a fixed retail price for their electricity usage.
This price only changes on a seasonal or yearly basis. However, it has been long recognized in the economics
community that charging consumers a flat rate for electricity creates allocative inefficiencies, i.e., consumers do not
pay equilibrium prices according to their consumption levels [1]. This was shown through an example in [2], which
illustrates how flat pricing causes deadweight loss at off-peak times and excessive demand at the peak times. The
latter may lead to small-scale blackouts in a short run and excessive capacity buildup over a long run. As a solution,
variable-rate metering that reflects the real-time cost of power generation can be used to influence consumers to
defer their power consumption away from the peak times. The reduced peak-load can significantly reduce the need
for expensive backup generation during peak times and excessive generation capacity.
The main technical hurdle in implementing real-time pricing has been the lack of cost-effective two-way smart
metering, which can communicate real-time prices to consumers and their consumption levels back to the energy
provider. In addition, the claim of social benefits from real-time pricing also assumes that the consumer demand is
elastic and responds to price changes while traditional consumers do not possess the equipments that enable them
to quickly alter their demands according to the changing power prices. Significant research efforts on real-time
pricing have involved estimating the consumer demand elasticity and the level of benefits that real time pricing can
achieve [1], [3], [4]. Fortunately, the above requirements on smart metering and consumer adaptability are being
fulfilled [5] as technology advances in cyber-enabled metering, power generation, power storage, and manufaturing
automation, which is driven by the need for a Smart Grid.
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2Such real-time pricing dynamics have been studied in the literature mainly with game theory [6]–[8]. In particular,
the authors in [6] provided a design mechanism with revelation principle to determine the optimal amount of
incentive that is needed for the customers to be willing to enter a contract with the utility and accept power
curtailment during peak periods. However, they only considered a fixed pricing scheme. In [7], the authors studied
games among consumers under a certain class of demand profiles at a price that is a function of day long aggregate
cost of global electricity load of all consumers. However, the case with real-time prices was not investigated in [7].
In [8], a noncooperative game was studied to tackle the real-time pricing problem, where the solution was obtained
by exploring the relationship with the congestion games and potential games. However, the pricing schemes that
we study are not amenable to transformations described in [8].
In this paper we formulate noncooperative games [9], [10] among the consumers with two real-time pricing
schemes under more general load profiles and revenue models. The first pricing scheme charges a price according
to the instantaneous average cost of electricity production and the second one charges according to a time-varying
version of increasing-block price [11]. We investigate consumer demands at the Nash equilibrium operation points
for their uniqueness and load balancing properties. Furthermore, two revenue models are considered for each of the
schemes, and we show that both pricing schemes lead to similar electricity loading patterns when consumers are
interested only in the minimization of electricity costs. We also demonstrate the relationship between these games
and certain competitive routing games [12], known as atomic flow games [13] from the computer networking
community. We show that the proposed noncooperative game formulation falls under the class of atomic splittable
flow games [14]. Specifically, we show that the noncooperative game amongst the consumers has the same structure
as that in the atomic splittable flow game over a two-node network with multiple parallel links between them. Finally
we discuss the conditions under which the increasing-block pricing scheme is preferred over the average-cost based
pricing scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system model, formulation of the noncooperative game, and its
relationship with the atomic flow games are presented in Section II. The game is analyzed with different real-time
pricing schemes under different revenue models in Sections III and IV, where the Nash equilibrium properties are
investigated. We conclude the paper in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We study the transaction of energy between a single electricity retailer and multiple consumers. In each given
time slot, each consumer has a demand for electric energy (measured in Watt-hour, Wh). The job of the retailer
is to satisfy demands from all the consumers. The electricity supply of the retailer is purchased from a variety of
sources over a wholesale electricity market and the retailer may possess some generation capacity as well. These
sources may use different technologies and fuels to generate electricity, which leads to different marginal costs of
electricity at the retailer, where the marginal cost is the incremental cost incurred to produce an additional unit of
output [15]. Mathematically, the marginal cost function is expressed as the first derivative of the total cost function.
Examples of the marginal cost function and the corresponding total cost are presented in Fig. 1(a) and Fig. 1(b),
respectively, which are based on real world data from the wholesale electricity market [3]. Naturally, the retailer
attempts to satisfy demands by procuring the cheapest source first1. This results in a non-decreasing marginal cost
of the supply curve, as illustrated through the example in Fig. 1(a). The retailer charges each consumer a certain
price for its consumption in order to cover the cost, where the sum payments by all the consumers should be enough
to cover the total cost and certain profit margin set by the retailer or regulatory body. In our model we assume that
all these are incorporated within the marginal cost of electricity.
While the retailer aims to procure sufficient supply to meet the sum demand of its consumers in each time slot,
in reality, the supply is limited by the generation capacity available in the wholesale electricity market. Thus, the
maximum sum load that the retailer can service bears an upper limit and we model this capacity limit by setting
the marginal cost of electricity to infinity when the sum load exceeds a predetermined threshold. Each consumer
has an energy demand in each time slot and it pays the retailer at a price that is set by the retailer such that, in
each time slot, the sum of payments made by all consumers meets the total cost in that slot. As such, a particular
1In real life the base load, i.e., the regular power that is demanded by the consumers, is satisfied from sources such as hydro, coal or
nuclear, as they are cheap. The fluctuating components of the demand are satisfied from sources such as oil, as the power-plants based on
oil are more flexible to control.
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Fig. 1. A hypothetical marginal cost of supply and the corresponding total cost curve as seen by the retailer in the wholesale market within
a single time slot. Supply is from five different sources: hydroelectric, nuclear, coal, natural gas, and oil. Two different generators may use
different technologies for power generation thus incurring different marginal costs with the same fuel (e.g., the two different cost levels for
oil in Fig. 1(a)).
consumer’s share of this bill depends on the retailer’s pricing scheme, which is a function of the demands from all
the consumers. Accordingly, as the total load varies over time, each consumer operates over a time-variant price
with time-slotted granularity. We assume that each consumer has a total demand for electricity over each day2,
which can be distributed throughout the day in a time-slotted manner, to maximize certain utility function. Next,
we model such individual load balancing behaviors as a noncooperative game.
A. Noncooperative Load Balancing Game
The noncooperative game between these consumers is formulated as follows. Consider a group of N consumers,
who submit their daily demands to a retailer in a time-slotted pattern at the beginning of the day (which contains T
time slots). These consumers are selfish and aim to maximize their individual utility/payoff functions; hence they
do not cooperate with each other to manage their demands. Each consumer i has a minimum total daily requirement
of energy, βi ≥ 0, which is split over the T time slots. Let xit denote the ith consumer’s demand in the tth time
slot. A consumer can demand any value xit ≥ 0 (negativity constraint) with
∑
t x
i
t ≥ βi (demand constraint). Let
x
i = {xi1, x
i
2, . . . , x
i
t, . . . , x
i
T },
represent the ith consumer’s demand vector, which is called the strategy for the ith consumer. Let
xt = {x
1
t , . . . , x
N
t },
represent the demand vector from all consumers in time slot t with xt =
∑
i x
i
t. Let x represent the set {x1, . . . ,xN}.
The payoff or utility for consumer i is denoted by pii which is the difference between the total revenue it generates
from the purchased electricity and its cost. In particular, let Eit , a function of xit, represent the revenue generated by
the ith consumer in the tth time slot and M it , a function of xt, represent its payment to the retailer for purchasing
xit. Then the payoff pii, to be maximized by consumer i, is given by
pii =
∑
t∈{1,...,T}
(
Eit −M
i
t
)
.
Since M it is a function of xt, we see that the consumer payoff is influenced by its load balancing strategy and
those of other consumers.
2Here we adopt one day as an operation period that contains a certain number of time slots. Obviously, such a choice has no impact on
the analytical results in this paper.
4We consider the problem of maximizing the payoff at each consumer by designing the distributed load balancing
strategy xi’s, under two real-time pricing schemes set by the retailer. The first one is the average-cost based pricing
scheme and the second one is the increasing-block pricing scheme. Specifically, for the first scheme the retailer
charges the consumers the average cost of electricity procurement that is only dependent on the sum demands,
xt, from all the consumers. For the second scheme, the retailer charges according to a marginal cost function that
depends on the vector of demands from all consumers, xt.
Let C(x) represent the cost of x units of electricity, to the retailer, from the wholesale market (an example
function is plotted in Fig. 1(b)). Then under the average-cost based pricing, the price per unit charged to the
consumers is given by
A(xt) =
C(xt)
xt
, , (1)
and at time t consumer i pays
M it = x
i
tA(xt) (2)
for consuming xit units of electricity. It is easy to see that
∑
iM
i
t = C(xt), i.e., with average-cost based pricing
the total payment made by the consumers covers the total cost to the retailer. Note that C ′(xt) gives the marginal
cost function in the wholesale market, henceforth denoted by C(xt) = C ′(xt) in the context of increasing-block
pricing (an example marginal cost curve is plotted in Fig. 1(a)). For reasons we discussed earlier, in the context
of electricity market, the marginal cost C(xt) is always non-negative and non-decreasing such that C(xt) is always
positive, non-decreasing, and convex. Briefly, we note that as the retailer capacity is constrained by a predetermined
upper limit U , we model this constraint as C(xt) = ∞, ∀xt > U ; obviously xit ≤ U is an implicit constraint on
the demand xit for any rational consumer.
The second scheme is a time-variant version of the increasing-block pricing scheme [11]. With a typical
increasing-block pricing scheme, consumer i is charged a certain rate b1 for its first z1 units consumed, then
charged rate b2 (> b1) for additional z2 units, and charged rate b3 (> b2) for additional z3 units, and so on. The
b’s and z’s describe the marginal cost price for the commodity. In our scheme we design a marginal cost function,
which retains the increasing nature of increasing-block pricing, such that it depends on xt and the function C(·).
Consumer i pays an amount determined by the marginal cost function M(x,xt), applicable to all consumers at
time slot t. In particular consumer i pays
M it =
∫ xi
t
0
M(x,xt)dx (3)
for consuming xit units of electricity where M(·) is chosen as
M(x,xt) = C

∑
j
min (x, xjt )

 ,
such that
∑
iM
i
t = C(xt) is satisfied. An intuition behind this pricing scheme is to penalize consumers with
relatively larger demands. Note that in this case, xit ≤ U is implicitly assumed by letting C(·) =∞ ∀xit > U and
hence M it =∞ ∀xit > U .
For each of the two pricing schemes, we study two different revenue models. For the first one we set Eit as zero
for all consumers over all time slots, which leads to payoff maximization being the same as cost minimization from
the point of view of the consumers. For the second one we assign consumer i a constant revenue rate φit at each
time slot t, which gives Eit = φitxit and leads to payoff maximization being the same as profit maximization.
B. Atomic Flow Games with Splittable Flows
The noncooperative game that we have formulated in the previous section is related to the following problem
in the network routing literature [12], [13]. Consider several agents each trying to establish paths from a specific
source node to some destination node in order to transport a fixed amount of traffic. In the context of Internet, each
agent can be viewed as a manager of packet routing. In the context of transportation, each agent can be a company
routing its fleet vehicles across the network of roads. The problem here is of competitive routing between agents,
5where each agent needs to deliver a given amount of flow over the network from its designated origin node to the
corresponding destination node. An agent can choose how to divide its flow amongst the available routes. On each
link the agents experience a certain delay. In the case of computer networks, if many agents collectively route a
large number of packets through a particular link, the packets will experience larger delays; and beyond a certain
level, the link may even start dropping packets, resulting in infinite delay. Such a delay can be referred to as cost,
which is a function of the link congestion or the total flow through the link. The cost of a path is the sum of the
link costs along the route.
To show the relationship between our noncooperative consumer load balancing problem and the above routing
problem, we can reformulate the load balancing problem into the following routing game over a network with two
nodes and multiple links [12]. We use notations similar to there in [12] in the interest of readability. Let there be
N agents who share a common source node and a common destination over a two-node network connected by T
parallel links (see Fig. 2). It is assumed that the agents do not cooperate. Each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , N} has a minimum
s t
xi1
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.
.
xiT
.
.
.
xit
(a) Flows from the ith agent.
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.
.
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(b) Sum of flows from all the agents.
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J i1
.
.
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J iT
.
.
.
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(c) Cost for different links for the ith
agent.
Fig. 2. A two node network with T links between source s and destination t.
throughput demand βi, which can be split among the T links as chosen by the agent. Let xit ≥ 0 denote the flow
that agent i sends through link t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. The sum of xit should add upto βi, i.e., βi =
∑
t x
i
t. Let xt =
∑
i x
i
t,
and xt = {x1t , . . . , xit, . . . , xNt }. The flow vector for agent i is denoted by the vector xi = {xi1, . . . , xit, . . . , xiT }.
The system flow vector is the collection of all agent flow vectors, denoted by x = {x1, . . . ,xi, . . . ,xN}. A given
x
i is feasible if its components obey the non-negativity constraint and the demand constraints. Let X i be the set
of all feasible choices of xi for agent i, and X be the set of all feasible choices of x.
Let J i(x) denote the cost for each agent i, which it wishes to minimize. Since J i(x) is a function of the flow
vector of all the agents, the best response of a given agent is a function of the responses from all the other agents;
and hence we can have a noncooperative game formulation. The Nash solution of the game is defined as the system
flow vector such that none of the agents can unilaterally improve their performance. Formally, xˆ ∈ X is a Nash
Equilibrium Point (NEP) if the following condition holds for all agents
J i(xˆ) = min
x
i∈X i
J i(xˆ1, . . . , xˆi−1,xi, xˆi+1, . . . , xˆN ),
where xˆj is the demand vector for the jth agent. The above noncooperative game is known as an atomic splittable
flow game [14], [16]. In [12], the existence of NEP is proved for the atomic splittable flow game over the two-node
network with parallel links when the following five assumptions (G1-G5) are satisfied for the cost function.
G1: J i is the sum of link cost functions, i.e., J i(x) =
∑T
t=1 J
i
t (xt).
G2: J it : [0,∞)N → [0,∞] is a continuous function.
G3: J it is convex over xit.
G4: Wherever finite, J it is continuously differentiable over xit.
G5: Sum capacities of all links is greater than the sum demands from all the agents.
The last assumption (G5) mentioned here is a simplification of the original assumption mentioned in [12], applicable
to two-node networks, while the original form of the assumption applies to more general networks. The consequence
of this assumption is that, at Nash equilibrium, all users incur finite link costs, i.e., J it <∞, ∀i, t.
6As a side-note, in [12], the uniqueness of NEP is further imposed for the two-node network if the cost function
J it additionally complies with the following assumptions:
A1: J it is a function of two arguments, namely agent i’s flow on link t and the total flow on that link, i.e.,
J it (xt) = J¯
i
t (x
i
t, xt).
A2: J¯ it is increasing over each of its two arguments.
A3: Let Kij =
∂J¯it
∂xit
. Wherever J it is finite, J¯ it is finite, and Kit = Kit(xit, xt) is strictly increasing in each of its two
arguments.
In particular, functions that comply with the assumptions G1-G5 and A1-A3 are referred to as type-A functions
in [12]. In the following sections we will apply some of the results in [12] to facilitate our analysis over the
noncooperative consumer load balancing game. The cost functions in our formulation do not satisfy all of the
assumptions A1-A3, and hence we use other means to prove uniqueness of NEP.
With our load balancing problem for each of the two pricing schemes in our game two different revenue models
are studied to provide more design insights, which leads to two different payoff structures. In the first model the
revenue is set to zero, such that payoff maximization is cost minimization. In the second model, the rate of revenue
generation at each consumer is set as a non-zero constant, such that payoff maximization is profit maximization.
III. NASH EQUILIBRIUM WITH AVERAGE-COST PRICING
For the average-cost pricing, the payment to the retailer in slot t by consumer i is given by (2).
A. Zero-Revenue Model
In this case the revenue is set to zero as
Eit = 0,
which results in payoff maximization being the same as cost minimization for each consumer. Specifically, the
payoff for consumer i is given by
pii = −
∑
t
M it .
The consumer load balancing problem for consumer i, for i = 1, . . . , N , is given by the following optimization
problem:
maximize pii(xi) = −
∑
t
M it
subject to M it = xitA(xt), ∀t,∑
t
xit ≥ βi,
xt =
∑
j
xjt , ∀t,
0 ≤ xit, ∀t.
As cost to the retailer becomes infinity whenever the total demand goes beyond the capacity threshold for the
wholesale market, i.e., when
C(xt) =∞ ∀xt > U,
the price to consumers will become infinite and their payoff will go to negative infinity. Thus any consumer facing
an infinite cost at a particular time slot can manipulate the demand vector such that the cost becomes finite, which is
always feasible as long as assumption G5 holds. This implies that, at Nash equilibrium, sum demand xt will be less
than the capacity threshold U, ∀t, which allows for a redundant constraint xit ≤ U, ∀i, t, as xit ≤
∑
i x
i
t = xt ≤ U .
Such a redundant but explicit constraint in turn makes the feasible region for x, denoted by X , finite and hence
compact. The compactness property will be later utilized to prove the Kakutani’s theorem [17].
7We have already shown that this game is similar to the routing game described in [12]. With the average-cost
based pricing and the zero-revenue model, the effective cost function for agent i to minimize in the routing game
is
J it = M
i
t = x
i
tA(xt) =
xit
xt
C(xt).
This cost function satisfies the assumptions G1-G5 given earlier. In particular, G1 holds as the total payment made
by the consumers satisfies
M i =
∑
t
M it ,
which is the cost to the agents in the routing formulation. In addition, G2 trivially holds by the definition of M it .
In order to satisfy G3, i.e., to show that J it is convex over xit, we show that
∂2Ji
t
∂xit
2 ≥ 0. First we evaluate
∂J it
∂xit
=
∂
(
xi
t
xt
C(xt)
)
∂xit
= . . .
=
(xt − x
i
t)A(xt) + x
i
tC
′(xt)
xt
.
(4)
Then we evaluate
∂2J it
∂xit
2 =
1
xt
2
[
2(xt − x
i
t)
(
C ′(xt)−
C(xt)
xt
)
+ xtx
i
tC
′′(xt)
]
.
(5)
Given C(x) is convex, both
(
C ′(xt)−
C(x
t
)
xt
)
≥ 0 and C ′′(xt) ≥ 0 hold; and therefore
∂2Ji
t
∂xit
2 ≥ 0. Thus J it is
convex over xit and G3 holds. The above also shows that J it is continuously differentiable over xit and hence G4
holds. Finally, we assume that G5 holds by construction. By the results in [12] we know that if the cost function
satisfies assumption G2 and G3, and X , is compact, there exists an NEP strategy for all agents. Therefore, the NEP
solution exists for the proposed noncooperative consumer load balancing game.
On the other hand, the cost function J it does not satisfy the assumption A3; so it is disqualified as a type-
A function defined in [12]. Therefore, the corresponding uniqueness result in [12] cannot be extended to our
formulation. Next, we prove the uniqueness of the NEP solution by extending the result in [14]. The number of
player types in a particular game refers to the number of different values for βi’s. Thus, a single type of players
implies that all players have the same value for βi’s. Next, we first introduce some definitions and show that our
load balancing problem satisfies the conditions for NEP uniqueness as described in [14]. We now begin with some
definitions from [14].
Definition 1. The component-join operation for two given graphs G1 = (V1, E1) and G2 = (V2, E2) consists of
merging any two vertices v1 ∈ V1 and v2 ∈ V2 into a single vertex v.
Definition 2. Consider two nodes, named hubs, then a hub-component is a connected graph formed by connecting
edges and nodes to the hubs such that all paths between the hubs remain vertex-disjoint.
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
.
.
.
Hub
Regular Node
Fig. 3. Hub-components. These five basic units are used to construct nearly-parallel graphs.
8Definition 3. A generalized nearly-parallel graph is any graph that can be constructed from hub-components
applying component-join operations.
The two-node network with parallel links in Fig. 2 is the first of the five basic units (as drawn in Fig. 3) of
nearly-parallel graphs [14], [18]; and by definitions a hub-component is also a generalized nearly-parallel graph.
Definition 4. A cost function f(x) is (strictly) semi-convex if xf(x) is (strictly) convex.
For the load balancing game with average-cost based pricing and zero revenue, the cost of consumer i is given
by (2) where the price A(xt) is given by (1), with A(xt) a non-negative and non-decreasing function. For the
function A(xt) to be strictly semi-convex, xtA(xt) needs to be strictly convex. Since C(xt) = xtA(xt) is the total
cost of electricity to the retailer, and we assume that the marginal cost price C ′(x) is a monotonically increasing
function, C(x) is strictly convex. Thus our problem is equivalent to an atomic flow game with splittable flows and
different player types (i.e., each player controls a different amount of total flow) over a generalized nearly-parallel
graph, which has strictly semi-convex, non-negative, and non-decreasing functions for cost per unit flow. By the
results of [14], the NEP solution for the load balancing game is unique.
In the following, we discuss the properties for the unique NEP solution for the proposed load balancing game.
Lemma 1. With the average-cost based pricing and zero revenue, at the Nash equilibrium the price of electricity
faced by all consumers is the same over all time slots.
Proof: Consider two arbitrary time slots t1 and t2. At the Nash equilibrium the sum demands in the system
over the two time slots are either the same or different. If the sum demands are equal over the two time slots,
by (1), we know that the price of electricity will be same over the two slots. If the sum demands are not equal,
without losing generality, let us assume xt1 < xt2 such that
A(xt1) < A(xt2) (6)
holds. Then any consumer j with xjt2 > 0 can reduce cost by reducing x
j
t2
and increasing xjt1 by the same small
quantity. This contradicts our assumption that the system is in equilibrium. Hence A(xt1) = A(xt2).
Lemma 2. If C(·) is strictly convex, at the Nash equilibrium, the sum of demands on the system, xt, keeps the
same across different time slots.
Proof: In order to prove this we will show that xt1 6= xt2 leads to contradiction. At Nash equilibrium we have
A(xt1) = A(xt2) from Lemma 1 for all possible t1 and t2. Thus, we obtain
A(xt1) = A(xt2)
⇔ C(xt1)/xt1 = C(xt2)/xt2
⇔ C(xt1) = C(xt2)
xt1
xt2
.
If C(·) is strictly convex and xt1 6= xt2 (without loss of generality say xt1 < xt2), by definition of strict convexity,
we have
C(xt1) <
xt2 − xt1
xt2
C(0) +
xt1
xt2
C(xt2)
⇒ C(xt2)
xt1
xt2
<
xt2 − xt1
xt2
× 0 +
xt1
xt2
C(xt2)
⇒ C(xt2)
xt1
xt2
<
xt1
xt2
C(xt2)
which is a contradiction and hence xt1 = xt2 .
Lemma 3. If C(·) is strictly convex, at Nash equilibrium, each consumer will distribute its demands equally over
the T time slots.
Proof: As the Nash equilibrium is unique, by symmetry over all the time slots, for consumer i we shall have
xit1 = x
i
t2
, ∀t1, t2,
9as otherwise we could swap the demand vectors xt1 and xt2 in time slots t1 and t2 without altering the Nash
equilibrium conditions and get another distinct NEP, thus contradicting the uniqueness. Thus, with
∑
t x
i
t ≥ βi and
the fact that the consumer is trying to minimize their cost such that
∑
t x
i
t = βi holds at equilibrium, we have the
solution xit = βi/T for all consumers i and time slots t.
Remark: Under the average-cost based pricing scheme with zero revenue, if one particular consumer increases its
total demand of electricity, the price A(·) increases, which in turn increases the payments for all other consumers
as well. Theoretically one consumer may cause indefinite increases in the payments of all others; and in this sense
this scheme does not protect the group from reckless action of some consumer(s). This issue will be addressed by
our second pricing scheme as we will show in Section IV.
B. Constant-Rate Revenue Model
In this case, the rate of revenue generation for each consumer at each time slot is taken as a non-negative constant
φit. Thus,
Eit = φ
i
t × x
i
t.
The consumer load balancing problem for each consumer i is given by the following optimization problem:
maximize pii(xi) =
∑
t
(
Eit −M
i
t
)
subject to Eit = φitxit, ∀t,
M it = x
i
tA(xt), ∀t,∑
t
xit ≥ βi,
xt =
∑
j
xjt , ∀t,
0 ≤ xit, ∀t.
We assume that βi = 0, ∀i, and the rate of revenue is larger than the price of electricity such that we do not
end up with any negative payoff or the trivial solution xit = 0, ∀i, t.
Here again, if the sum demand in a given time slot t exceeds the retailer’s capacity threshold U , the consumers
will face an infinite price for their consumption. This implies that, at Nash equilibrium the sum demand xt will
never exceed the capacity threshold U , as G5 holds. This again allows for the redundant constraint xit ≤ U, ∀i, t,
as xit ≤
∑
i x
i
t = xt ≤ U , which in turn makes the feasible region for x, X , finite and hence compact.
We briefly show that under these assumptions there exists an NEP for this game. In particular, the effective cost
function for the corresponding routing game is given as
J it = M
i
t − φ
i
t × x
i
t. (7)
As M it is continuous in xt, J it is continuous in xt as well and satisfies assumption G2. We have already shown
that M it under the average-cost based pricing scheme is convex in xit through (5). The function −φitxit is linear and
hence convex in xit. Thus, by the property that the summation of two convex functions is convex, J it from (7) is
convex in xit and hence satisfies assumption G3. Following the proof in [12], we consider the point-to-set mapping
x ∈ X → Γ(x) ⊂ X defined as
Γ(x) = {xˆ ∈ X : xˆi ∈ arg min
z
i∈X i
J i(x1, . . . , zi, . . . ,xN )}, (8)
where Γ is an upper semicontinuous mapping (by the continuity assumption G2) that maps each point of the convex
compact set X into a closed (by G2) convex (by G3) subset of X . By the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem [17],
there exists a fixed point x ∈ Γ(x) and such a point is an NEP [19].
Lemma 4. At the Nash equilibrium, the consumer(s) with the highest revenue rate (φit) within the time slot, may
be the only one(s) buying the power in that time slot.
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Proof: For a given time slot t consumer i has an incentive to increase its demand xit as long as the payoff can
increase, i.e., as long as
∂pii
∂xit
> 0.
Therefore at the equilibrium the following holds for all consumers.
∂pii
∂xit
≤ 0
⇒
∂
(
Eit −M
i
t
)
∂xit
≤ 0
⇒
∂Eit
∂xit
−
∂M it
∂xit
≤ 0
⇒ φit ≤
∂M it
∂xit
=
C(xt)
xt
= A(xt)
For the consumers with a strict inequality φit < A(xt), the rate of revenue is less than the price per unit of electricity
at time t; hence the revenue is less than the cost, Eit < M it , such that buying electricity will incur them a negative
payoff and hence all such consumers, with φit < A(xt), will not buy any power in that time slot, i.e., xit = 0.
Therefore only the set of consumers {argmaxk φkt }, i.e., the consumers who enjoy the maximum rate of revenue
may be able to purchase electricity.
Thus if consumer i has the maximum rate of revenue, either it is the only consumer buying non-zero power xit
such that φit = A(xit) or φit < C ′(0) and hence xit = 0 in that time slot, which leads to a unique Nash equilibrium
for the sub-game. If in a given time slot multiple consumers experience the same maximum rate of revenue, the
sub-game will turn into a Nash Demand Game [20] between the set of consumers given by {argmaxk φkt }, which
is well known to admit multiple Nash equilibriums. Thus the overall noncooperative game has a unique Nash
equilibrium if and only if, in each time slot, at most one consumer experiences the maximum rate of revenue.
IV. NASH EQUILIBRIUM WITH INCREASING-BLOCK PRICING
In this section we study the load balancing game with the time-variant increasing-block pricing scheme. Under
this scheme consumer i pays M it for xit units of electricity, which is given by (3) with M(x,xt) the marginal cost
function posed to the consumer. Thus, as defined before, we have
M(x,xt) = C

∑
j
min (x, xjt )

 .
As an example, if the demands from different consumers at time slot t are identical, i.e., if xit = x
j
t , ∀i, j, we have,
M(x,xt) = C(Nx).
A. Zero-Revenue Model
In this case the payment by consumer i is given by (3)
M it =
∫ xi
t
0
M(x,xt)dx.
The consumer load balancing problem for each consumer i is given by the following optimization problem:
maximize pii(xi) = −
∑
t
M it
subject to M it =
∫ xi
t
0
M(x,xt)dx, ∀t,∑
t
xit ≥ βi,
0 ≤ xit, ∀t.
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If the sum demand xt in a time slot t exceeds U , the price of electricity for the consumer with the highest demand
(indexed by jˆ) becomes infinite. As we retain the assumption G5, consumer jˆ can rearrange its demand vector such
that either the sum demand becomes within the capacity threshold or consumer jˆ is no longer the highest demand
consumer (then the new customer with the highest demand performs the same routine until the sum demand is
under the threshold). This implies that, at the Nash equilibrium point we have xt ≤ U . Similarly, we now have the
redundant constraint xit ≤ U, ∀ i, t, which in turn makes the feasible region X finite and hence compact.
As M it is continuous in xt, in the corresponding routing game we have that
J it = M
i
t (9)
is continuous in xt and satisfies assumption G2. In addition, M it is convex in xit as its derivative, the marginal
cost function M(x,xt), is non-decreasing. Thus, J it is convex in xit and hence satisfies assumption G3. Following
the proof in [12], we consider the point-to-set mapping x ∈ X → Γ(x) ⊂ X defined the same as in (8). By the
Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem [17], there exists a fixed point x ∈ Γ(x) and such a point is an NEP.
When each consumer tries to minimize its total cost while satisfying its minimum daily energy requirement βi,
we have the following result.
Lemma 5. If C(·) is strictly convex, the Nash equilibrium is unique and each consumer distributes its demand
uniformly over all time slots.
Proof: For the equilibrium conditions to be satisfied,
M(xit1 ,xt1) =M(x
i
t2
,xt2), ∀i, t1, t2,
should hold; otherwise consumer i can increase payoff by varying xit1 and xit2 , in a similar argument to that for
Lemma 1. This condition can be rewritten after expanding M(·) as
C

∑
j
min (xit1 , x
j
t1
)

 = C

∑
j
min (xit2 , x
j
t2
)

 , ∀i, t1, t2. (10)
Given that C(·) is strictly convex, we have C(·) = C ′(·) monotonically increasing, which gives
C(z1) = C(z2)⇔ z1 = z2. (11)
Therefore, (10) implies ∑
j
min (xit1 , x
j
t1
) =
∑
j
min (xit2 , x
j
t2
), ∀i, t1, t2. (12)
Now assume that there exists an NEP x with demand vectors xt1 6= xt2 . Let P represent the subset of consumers
with unequal demands in time slots t1 and t2, i.e.,
P = {k|xkt1 6= x
k
t2 , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}}.
Then let a represent the consumer from subset P with the highest value of demand in time slot t1, i.e.,
a = argmax
k∈P
xkt1 , (13)
and let b represent the consumer from subset P with the highest value of demand in time slots t2, i.e.,
b = argmax
k∈P
xkt2 . (14)
From (12) we have ∑
j
min (xat1 , x
j
t1
) =
∑
j
min (xat2 , x
j
t2
), ∀t1, t2, (15)
and ∑
j
min (xbt1 , x
j
t1
) =
∑
j
min (xbt2 , x
j
t2
), ∀t1, t2. (16)
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Combining (12) and (13) leads to ∑
j
min (xat1 , x
j
t1
) ≥
∑
j
min (xbt1 , x
j
t1
); (17)
combining (12) and (14) leads to ∑
j
min (xat2 , x
j
t2
) ≤
∑
j
min (xbt2 , x
j
t2
). (18)
If xat1 6= x
b
t1
or xat2 6= x
b
t2
, (17) holds with strict inequality. With (15), (16), and (17), we have∑
j
min (xat2 , x
j
t2
) >
∑
j
min (xbt2 , x
j
t2
),
which contradicts (18). If xat1 = xbt1 and xat2 = xbt2 , (15) and (16) imply xat1 = xat2 and xbt1 = xbt2 , respectively,
which contradicts that a, b ∈ P. This implies that the set P is empty, which contradicts that xt1 6= xt2 .
Hence we have
xit1 = x
i
t2 ∀i, t1, t2,
and the solution is given by xit = βi/T, ∀i, t. Under the necessary conditions for NEP (10), this is the only solution
for the set x, hence NEP is unique.
Remark: Notice that under the zero-revenue model, the NEP point is the same with both increasing-block pricing
and average-cost based pricing. For both the cases, at NEP, we have xit = βi/T, ∀i, t. However, even though the
loading pattern is similar, the payments M it made by the consumers will differ and, with increasing-block pricing,
will likely be lesser for consumers with relatively lower consumption. In addition, with increasing-block pricing,
the maximum payment M it made by the ith consumer given xit demand will be C(Nxit)/N , irrespective of what
other consumers demand and consume. Thus this addresses the issue faced under the average-cost based pricing and
zero-revenue model, in which one consumer can increase their demand indefinitely and cause indefinite increase
in the payments of all other consumers.
B. Constant-Rate Revenue Model
The consumer load balancing problem for consumer i is given by the following optimization problem:
maximize pii(xi) =
∑
t
(
Eit −M
i
t
)
subject to Eit = φitxit, ∀t,
M it =
∫ xi
t
0
M(x,xt)dx, ∀t,∑
t
xit ≥ βi,
0 ≤ xit, ∀t.
Here again, we assume βi = 0, ∀i, to avoid any negative payoffs and we could agree for the redundant constraint
xit ≤ U, ∀ i, t, which in turn makes the feasible region for X finite and hence compact.
In this case, we briefly show that with increasing-block pricing and a constant-rate for revenue, there exists an
NEP solution for this game. First, the cost function in the corresponding routing game is given by
J it = M
i
t − φ
i
t × x
i
t, (19)
where M it is continuous in xt, and therefore J it is continuous in xt and satisfies assumption G2. We have already
shown that M it under the increasing-block pricing scheme is convex in xit in the previous subsection. The function
−φitx
i
t is linear and hence convex in xit as well. Thus, J it from (19) is convex in xit and hence satisfies assumption
G3. By the same point-to-set mapping argument as that for Lemma 1, we can have that there exists a fixed point
x ∈ Γ(x) and such a point is NEP.
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With the average-cost based pricing scheme under the constant-rate revenue model, we see that in a given time
slot, if a single consumer enjoys the maximum rate of revenue, it will be the only consumer who is able to purchase
power. We show here that with the increasing-block pricing scheme under constant-rate revenue model, the result
is different.
For a given time slot t, consumer i has an incentive to increase their demand xit as long as the payoff increases,
i.e.,
∂pii
∂xit
> 0.
Therefore at the equilibrium the following holds for all consumers:
∂pii
∂xit
≤ 0
⇒ φit ≤
∂M it
∂xit
=M(xit,xt).
(20)
Additionally, if φit <M(xit,xt), J it can be reduced by reducing xit. This implies that if xit > 0, at the equilibrium
we have
φit ≥M(x
i
t,xt). (21)
Thus (20) and (21) together imply that, if xit > 0, we have
φit =M(x
i
t,xt).
Together we can write the following set of necessary conditions for equilibrium,
φit =M(x
i
t,xt) if φit ≥M(0,xt),
xit = 0 if φit <M(0,xt).
(22)
For illustration, we simulate a scenario consisting of 100 consumers, who have their rate of revenue φit generated
from a uniform distribution ranging over $0 − $100/MWh, where the marginal cost to the retailer C(·) is given
by Fig. 1(a). In Fig. 4 we plot the demand xit versus the rate of revenue (φit) at a given time slot t, where xit is
evaluated over i = {1, . . . , 100}. The equilibrium is obtained by iterative updates of M(·) and xt until convergence
within an error tolerance as in (22).
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Fig. 4. Demand xit versus the rate of revenue (φit) at equilibrium. Each dot represents a particular consumer i = {1, . . . , 100}.
Thus, unlike with the average-cost pricing, where only the consumer with the maximum rate of revenue could
purchase electricity at the equilibrium, any consumer may procure a non-zero amount of energy as long as its own
rate of revenue is larger than M(0,xt).
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we formulated noncooperative games among the consumers of Smart Grid with two real-time
pricing schemes to derive autonomous load balancing solutions. The first pricing scheme charges consumers a price
that is equal to the average cost of electricity borne by the retailer and the second scheme charges consumers an
amount that is dependent on the incremental marginal cost which is shown to protect consumers from irrational
behaviors. Two revenue models were considered for each of the pricing schemes, for which we investigated the
Nash equilibrium operation points for their uniqueness and load balancing properties. For the zero-revenue model,
we showed that when consumers are interested only in the minimization of electricity costs, the Nash equilibrium
point is unique with both the pricing schemes and leads to similar electricity loading patterns in both cases. For the
constant-rate revenue model, we showed the existence of Nash equilibrium with both the pricing schemes and the
uniqueness results with the average-cost based pricing scheme. Throughout the paper, we utilized the relationship
between the load balancing games and the atomic splittable flow games from the computer networking community
to prove the properties at the Nash Equilibrium solutions.
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